We rigorously describe the relation in which a credence function should stand to a set of chance functions in order for these to be compatible in the way mandated by the Principal Principle. This resolves an apparent contradiction in the literature, by means of providing a formal way of combining credences with modest chance functions so that the latter indeed serve as guides for the former. Along the way we note some problematic consequences of taking admissibility to imply requirements involving probabilistic independence. We also argue, contra (Hawthorne et al., The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(1), 123–131 2017), that the Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.

我们严格描述了可信度函数应与一组机会函数之间的关系，以便它们以主原理要求的方式兼容。这解决了文献中的一个明显矛盾，通过提供一种正式的方式将可信度与适度的机会函数相结合，以便后者确实可以作为前者的指南。在此过程中，我们注意到将 Acceptability 视为暗示涉及概率独立性的要求的一些有问题的后果。我们还认为，与此相反（Hawthorne et al.， The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science，68（1）， 123–131 2017），主要原则并不意味着冷漠原则。