For some post-structuralist complexity theorists, there are no epistemic meta-perspectives from where to judge between different epistemic perspectives toward complex systems. In this paper, I argue that these theorists face a dilemma because they argue against meta-perspectives from just such a meta-perspective. In fact, when we understand two or more different perspectives, we seem to unavoidably adopt a meta-perspective to analyse, compare, and judge between those perspectives. I further argue that meta-perspectives can be evaluated and judged from meta-meta-perspectives, and so on. This suggests an epistemic hierarchy. Perspectives, meta-perspectives, meta-meta-perspectives, etc. can be ranked according to the degree to which they confer understanding. I also explore what scope my thesis might have outside the philosophy of complexity by applying it to the sociology of science. 

对于一些后结构主义复杂性理论家来说，没有认识论的元视角来判断对复杂系统的不同认识论观点。在本文中，我认为这些理论家面临一个两难境地，因为他们从这样的元角度反对元观点。事实上，当我们理解两个或多个不同的观点时，我们似乎不可避免地采用了元视角来分析、比较和判断这些观点。我进一步论证了元视角可以从元元视角来评价和判断，等等。这表明了一种认识等级制度。观点、元视角、元元视角等可以根据它们赋予理解的程度进行排名。我还通过将我的论文应用于科学社会学，探索了我的论文在复杂性哲学之外可能具有的范围。