Explanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of the kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for Biological Essentialism, the contentious claim that biological species have essences. The paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of five-toed jerboas within the Scarturus elater species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby showing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support Biological Essentialism, and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the relevance of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline.

解释本质主义 （EE） 是这样一种观点，即属性是某种的本质，因为它因果地解释了该类实例所表现出的许多属性。本文研究了 EE 在生物物种上的应用，我称之为生物解释本质主义 （BEE）。BEE 指出，特定的生物起源是一个物种的本质，因为它导致某些生物体表现出与该物种相关的一组特性。评估 BEE 很重要，因为它为生物本质主义提供了一个新的论点，生物本质主义是有争议的生物物种具有本质的主张。本文批判性地评估了 BEE 的实证基础，重点关注单一生物起源导致与相关物种相关的许多特性的假设。通过讨论 Scarturus elater 物种复合体中的五趾跳鼠案例，我挑战了这一假设，从而表明隐蔽物种对 BEE 构成了严重障碍。我的结论是，BEE 不支持生物本质主义，并建议本质主义哲学家重新考虑因果解释因素在解释生物物种的所谓本质时的相关性。这些哲学家可能需要探索这些因素之外的替代方案，我简要概述了其中之一。