Philosophers of science have variously tried to characterize how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and distinguish them from how-actually explanations (HAEs). I argue that existing contributions to this debate have failed to pay attention to the different, but complementary, functions possibilities play in scientific explanations. To bring these functions to the fore, I introduce a distinction between what I call elucidating and embedding HPEs. While elucidating HPEs specify and demonstrate possible processes for a given research target, embedding HPEs demonstrate how the research target fits into a space of suitably constrained possibilities. I specify both functions of HPE with reference to two case studies from origins-of-life research. I contrast my distinction with an alternative proposal by Wirling and Grüne-Yanoff (2024) to highlight that focusing on the functions, rather than types, of possibilities in explanation is better suited to account for key scientific practices.

科学哲学家们以不同的方式试图描述如何可能的解释 （HPE） 并将其与实际如何解释 （HAE） 区分开来。我认为，对这场辩论的现有贡献没有注意到可能性在科学解释中发挥的不同但互补的功能。为了突出这些功能，我引入了我所说的阐明和嵌入 HPE 之间的区别。在阐明 HPE 指定和演示给定研究目标的可能过程时，嵌入 HPE 展示了研究目标如何适应适当限制的可能性空间。我参考了生命起源研究的两个案例研究来指定 HPE 的两项功能。我将我的区别与 Wirling 和 Grüne-Yanoff （2024） 的替代建议进行对比，以强调在解释中关注可能性的功能而不是类型更适合解释关键的科学实践。