We analyze Michael Heim’s significant concept of the metaphysics of virtual worlds and show that his concept does not meet the two basic metatheses of metaphysics understood as ontology. First, Heim defines virtual worlds as knowledge, more specifically as informational equivalents of physical things; and worlds understood in this way are not objects in the ontological sense of the term. Secondly, Heim claims that virtual worlds do not exist, and attributes to them various degrees of non-existence, and the metaphysics of non-existent in various degrees virtual objects is extremely hard to accept. We propose replacing these two essential elements in Heim’s concept with others. In result, we form a metaphysics of existent and objectivized virtual worlds, on the basis of the ideas postulated by Heim.

我们分析了迈克尔·海姆 （Michael Heim） 关于虚拟世界形而上学的重要概念，并表明他的概念不符合被理解为本体论的形而上学的两个基本元论。首先，海姆将虚拟世界定义为知识，更具体地说是物理事物的信息等价物;以这种方式理解的世界不是该术语本体论意义上的对象。其次，海姆声称虚拟世界不存在，并赋予它们不同程度的不存在，而不同程度的虚拟对象不存在的形而上学是极其难以接受的。我们建议用其他元素替换 Heim 概念中的这两个基本元素。结果，我们在海姆假设的思想基础上形成了一个存在和客观化的虚拟世界的形而上学。