This paper investigates the status of inference to the best explanation (IBE), in contrast to inference to the only explanation (IOE) against the background of Woodward's what-if-things- had-been-different (w) account of explanation. It argues that IBE is not a defensible form of inference. By contrast IOE is defensible and objections to its use (e.g., on the basis of claims about underdetermination) are exaggerated. Although some accounts of explanation in conjunction support IBE, the w-account does not. It is also argued that we should think of explanation as an independent goal of scientific investigation that is valuable in its own right and not because it is a means to discovering truths via IBE. The correct picture of the connection between explanation and truth is simply that successful explanation requires a true or effectively correct explanans. However, we cannot establish that an explanans has this feature by appealing to its potential explanatory power– that it would if true explain well. Instead, evidence that is independent of potential explanatory power is required. This is what IOE provides.

本文在伍德沃德的假设事物如何不同 （w） 解释的背景下研究了对最佳解释的推理 （IBE） 的状态，而不是对唯一解释的推理 （IOE）。它认为 IBE 不是一种站得住脚的推理形式。相比之下，IOE 是有道理的，对其使用的反对意见（例如，基于关于不确定的主张）被夸大了。尽管一些解释的结合支持 IBE，但 w 账户不支持。还有人认为，我们应该将解释视为科学研究的一个独立目标，它本身就很有价值，而不是因为它是通过 IBE 发现真理的一种手段。解释和真理之间联系的正确描述很简单，成功的解释需要一个真实或有效的正确解释。然而，我们不能通过诉诸其潜在的解释力来确定解释性具有这一特征——如果它是真的，它会很好地解释。相反，需要独立于潜在解释力的证据。这就是 IOE 提供的。