Assigning the preparation of decisions to specialized committees composed of member state representatives is a widespread response to the ‘governor's dilemma’, that is, the tension between competence and control, in international organizations (IOs). We theorize a causal mechanism referring to self‐selection and agenda‐setting effects and show how the resulting division of labor among IO bodies produces organizational influence beyond current accounts of committee governance. We demonstrate why specialized committees develop a distinct rationale of accommodating expertise with member state preferences, even if composed of member state representatives, and why agreed committee proposals are difficult to overcome by final decision‐making bodies. We argue that the organization of IO decision processes constitutes an important source of IO autonomy beyond the activities of IO administrations and independent from socialization or predispositions of individual committee members. Empirically, we show that IO committees meet the theoretically derived prerequisites for activating the causal mechanism and trace how committee influence according to the mechanism has shaped an important IO decision.

中文翻译：

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国际组织专门委员会是组织自主权的重要来源


将决策的准备工作交给由成员国代表组成的专门委员会是对国际组织 （IO） 中“州长困境”的广泛回应，即能力与控制之间的紧张关系。我们理论化了一种涉及自我选择和议程设置效应的因果机制，并展示了 IO 机构之间由此产生的分工如何在当前委员会治理账户之外产生组织影响力。我们说明了为什么专门委员会会制定出一种独特的理由，即使由会员国代表组成，也会根据会员国的偏好来容纳专业知识，以及为什么最终决策机构难以克服商定的委员会提案。我们认为，IO 决策过程的组织构成了 IO 自主权的重要来源，超越了 IO 管理部门的活动，并且独立于委员会成员的社会化或倾向。从实证上讲，我们表明 IO 委员会满足了激活因果机制的理论推导的先决条件，并追踪了委员会根据该机制的影响如何塑造了重要的 IO 决策。