This paper aims to evaluate the relevance of Kant’s much discussed essentialism and mechanism for present-day philosophy of psychiatry. Kendler et al. (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011) have argued that essentialism is inadequate for conceptualizing psychiatric disorders. In this paper, I develop this argument in detail by highlighting a variety of essentialism that differs from the one rejected by Kendler et al. I show that Kant’s essentialism is not directly affected by the argument of Kendler et al. (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011), and that Kendler et al.’s (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011) argument also does not affect other essentialist positions in psychiatry. Hence, the rejection of essentialism in psychiatry needs more arguments than the one supplied by Kendler et al. Nevertheless, the study of current psychiatry also provides reasons to reject Kant’s essentialism and his transcendental project. I argue that Kant’s theory of mechanical explanation is more relevant for analyzing present-day philosophy of psychiatry, insofar as (a) modern psychiatric research into the causes of psychiatric disorders fits the mechanist paradigm, (b) Kant’s theory of mechanical explanation is importantly similar to modern theories of mechanical explanation applicable to psychiatry, such as those of Bechtel and associates, and (c) Kant’s stance that mechanism constitutes a regulative ideal points to useful arguments for the pursuit of mechanical explanations in psychiatry.

本文旨在评估康德被广泛讨论的本质主义和机制与当今精神病学哲学的相关性。Kendler 等人 （Psychological Medicine 41（6）：1143–1150， 2011） 认为本质主义不足以概念化精神疾病。在本文中，我通过强调与 Kendler 等人所拒绝的各种本质主义不同的本质主义来详细发展这一论点。我表明康德的本质主义并不直接受到 Kendler 等人（心理医学 41（6）：1143–1150， 2011）的论点的影响，并且 Kendler 等人（心理医学 41（6）：1143–1150,2011）的论点也不会影响精神病学中的其他本质主义立场。因此，在精神病学中拒绝本质主义需要比 Kendler 等人提供的论据更多的论据。然而，对当前精神病学的研究也为拒绝康德的本质主义和他的先验项目提供了理由。我认为康德的机械解释理论与分析当今的精神病学哲学更相关，因为 （a） 对精神疾病原因的现代精神病学研究符合机械论范式，（b） 康德的机械解释理论与适用于精神病学的现代机械解释理论在重要上相似，例如 Bechtel 及其同事的理论， （c） 康德关于机制构成规范性理想的立场为在精神病学中寻求机械解释提供了有用的论据。