Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuclear balance matters militarily, perhaps allowing an escape from the nuclear stalemate, and show that greater nuclear capabilities unambiguously improve security under narrow circumstances. If they improve first-strike advantages or if the nuclear stalemate is fragile, they may improve peaceful terms, but only by raising the risk of disaster. I discuss the implications of this argument for our understanding of the U.S. nuclear policy in the Cold War.

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关于核优势和国家安全


核优势能改善国家安全吗？核革命理论 （TNR） 认为它没有，但前提是假设核平衡在军事上无关紧要。批评者认为确实如此，并指出美国在冷战期间努力实现核优势，当时的核僵局并不像以前认为的那么稳定。然而，华盛顿可能被误导了。我提供了一个博弈论模型，其中核平衡在军事上很重要，也许可以摆脱核僵局，并表明更强大的核能力在狭隘的情况下可以明确地改善安全。如果他们提高了先发制人的优势，或者如果核僵局很脆弱，他们可能会改善和平条款，但只能通过提高灾难的风险来实现。我将讨论这一论点对我们理解冷战期间美国核政策的影响。