We explore, both theoretically and through a laboratory experiment, the impact of different forms of higher-order punishment on third-party behavior and cooperation levels within a public goods game. This investigation may shed light on how norms influence national governments, as monitored by international organizations or disciplined by electoral competition, and how these norms are subsequently enforced on and followed by domestic agents, e.g., businesses. Specifically, we compare two main treatments that represent the effects of competitive elections and external monitors in a stylized form. These treatments are contrasted with a control condition that lacks an additional layer of norm enforcement. While both higher-order punishment institutions enhance cooperation compared to the control, our findings reveal differences between the two scenarios: Evaluation of the third party by an uninvolved agent leads to heightened punishment and reduced free-riding, whereas competition between two third-party candidates results in more strategic and selective punitive actions.

我们从理论上和实验室实验上探讨了不同形式的高阶惩罚对公共产品游戏中第三方行为和合作水平的影响。这项调查可能会阐明规范如何影响国家政府，由国际组织监督或受选举竞争约束，以及这些规范随后如何被国内代理人（例如企业）执行和遵循。具体来说，我们比较了代表竞争性选举和风格化形式的外部监督员效果的两种主要处理方式。这些处理与缺乏额外规范执行层的控制条件形成对比。虽然与对照组相比，两种高阶惩罚机构都加强了合作，但我们的研究结果揭示了两种情况之间的差异：由不参与的代理人对第三方进行评估会导致更严厉的惩罚和更少的搭便车行为，而两个第三方候选人之间的竞争会导致更具战略性和选择性的惩罚行动。