The traditional narrative of Europe’s first wave of democratization is that elites extended the franchise in response to revolutionary threats and reformed majoritarian electoral systems to limit rising working-class parties. This stylized account does not fit early twentieth-century South America, where democratization was driven by internal competition within incumbent parties, without strong working-class parties to contain. I study Argentina’s 1912 electoral reform that introduced elements of democracy (secret and compulsory voting) and simultaneously changed the electoral system from multi-member plurality to the limited vote. To study the motivations behind the electoral system change component of the reform package, I analyze expert surveys, legislative debates, and a 1911 public opinion poll. Granting representation to political minorities was regarded not as an electoral containment strategy to benefit incumbents, but a progressive measure to make opposition parties more competitive. An analysis of roll-call votes shows that legislators who supported the reform were those expecting to not be adversely affected.

中文翻译：

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遏制的对立面：阿根廷 1912 年民主过渡时期的选举制度变化


关于欧洲第一波民主化浪潮的传统叙述是，精英们扩大了选举权以应对革命威胁，并改革了多数选举制度以限制崛起的工人阶级政党。这种程式化的说法并不适合 20 世纪初的南美洲，那里的民主化是由现任政党内部竞争驱动的，没有强大的工人阶级政党可以遏制。我研究了阿根廷 1912 年的选举改革，该改革引入了民主元素（秘密和强制投票），同时将选举制度从多人多数改为有限投票。为了研究改革方案中选举制度改革部分背后的动机，我分析了专家调查、立法辩论和 1911 年的民意调查。授予政治少数派代表权并不被视为有利于现任者的选举遏制策略，而是使反对党更具竞争力的进步措施。对唱名表决的分析表明，支持这项改革的立法者是那些预计不会受到不利影响的立法者。