Rebel leaders can prolong civil wars. Although past research has examined how rebel groups have shaped civil wars, little attention has been paid to rebel leaders. I argue that civil wars last longer and are less likely to be terminated in government-favorable outcomes when rebel leaders with training in a nonstate armed group are in charge, in contrast to leaders with no training or state military service. Nonstate training makes leaders more capable of continuing the conflict with few weapons and resources and more willing to persevere because of their combatant socialization. The rebel leaders trained in creativity and perseverance are more likely to make strategic choices that heighten bargaining challenges and the risk of bargaining failure thus leading to longer wars. I test propositions through a quantitative analysis of all rebel leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015. The analysis is supplemented with a qualitative discussion based on personal interviews with top-level leaders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.

中文翻译：

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反抗训练：叛军领袖的军事训练和内战动态


叛军领导人可以延长内战。尽管过去的研究考察了叛乱组织如何影响内战，但很少有人关注叛乱领导人。我认为，与没有受过培训或未服过国家兵役的领导人相比，当受过非国家武装团体培训的叛乱领导人掌权时，内战持续时间更长，而且不太可能以对政府有利的结果结束。非国家训练使领导人更有能力在武器和资源匮乏的情况下继续冲突，并且由于他们的战斗员社会化而更愿意坚持下去。受过创造力和毅力训练的叛军领袖更有可能做出战略选择，从而增加讨价还价的挑战和讨价还价失败的风险，从而导致更持久的战争。我通过对 1989 年至 2015 年内战中所有叛军领导人的定量分析来检验命题。该分析还辅以基于对 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 高层领导人的个人访谈的定性讨论。