Research SummaryEntrepreneurs have increasingly entered digital crowdfunding platforms as a viable option for acquiring capital. This paper examines how high‐performance outliers—projects that raised substantial amounts of capital—affect other entrepreneurs' decisions to enter crowdfunding. The present study focuses on the two largest rewards‐based crowdfunding platforms, Kickstarter and Indiegogo. Results indicate that, following outliers, entry was relatively higher on the platform with less restrictive, entrant‐friendly governance (i.e., Indiegogo). This effect was more pronounced among low‐quality entrants and moderated by projects in categories that have higher capital requirements. The findings suggest that differences in platform governance influence how subsequent entrepreneurial entrants behave.Managerial SummaryEntrepreneurs use crowdfunding as a viable source of capital. This paper looks at how outliers—projects that raise substantial capital—affected subsequent entry decisions by other entrepreneurs onto the two largest platforms, Kickstarter and Indiegogo. Outliers led to relatively more projects joining Indiegogo, but those projects were disproportionately of low quality. Projects in categories that typically seek more money disproportionately joined Kickstarter. When considered in the context of platform competition, not only does platform governance affect levels of entry on a platform, it also alters the relative mix of entrants that join each platform.

中文翻译：

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高绩效异常值如何影响竞争性众筹平台上的相对创业者进入


研究摘要企业家越来越多地进入数字众筹平台，将其作为获取资金的可行选择。本文研究了高绩效异常值（筹集了大量资金的项目）如何影响其他企业家进入众筹的决定。本研究的重点是两个最大的基于奖励的众筹平台，Kickstarter 和 Indiegogo。结果表明，在异常值之后，在限制较少、对进入者友好的治理平台（即 Indiegogo）上，入场率相对较高。这种影响在低质量的进入者中更为明显，并且受到资本要求较高类别的项目的调节。研究结果表明，平台治理的差异会影响后续创业者的行为方式。管理摘要企业家将众筹作为可行的资金来源。本文着眼于异常值（筹集大量资金的项目）如何影响其他企业家随后进入两个最大的平台（Kickstarter 和 Indiegogo）的决定。异常值导致加入 Indiegogo 的项目相对较多，但这些项目的质量不成比例地低。通常寻求更多资金的类别的项目不成比例地加入了 Kickstarter。在平台竞争的背景下考虑时，平台治理不仅会影响平台的准入级别，还会改变加入每个平台的参赛者的相对组合。