Regulatory review—assessing the legality, use of evidence, and correct calculation of costs and benefits in regulations before they are enacted—is a core function of regulatory oversight bodies. In principle, reviewing aims to improve the effectiveness of regulations through economic rationality, tools, and methods. In practice, the work of oversight bodies occurs amid the politics of the rulemaking process and can be a way for the executive to control the regulatory agenda. Based on a 13‐month ethnography of Mexico's regulatory oversight body, I examine how analysts enact the technical and legal requirements of regulatory improvement while facing political tensions and interference. Using negotiated order theory, I show how analysts respond to political attention, conflict, or interference by expanding, shielding, or bending their mandate and conducting their work accordingly. Reviewing to improve regulations takes on different meanings and forms, allowing analysts to protect their work, organization, and techno‐legal mandate in the long term. The article contributes to a better understanding of regulatory review and oversight bodies. More importantly, it draws attention to how workers make ambitious statecraft projects like regulatory improvement possible by continuously reconciling the legal, technical, and political dimensions of their work.

中文翻译：

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监管监督的政治：分析师在审查法规时如何扩大、保护或弯曲其职责


监管审查 — 在法规颁布之前评估法规的合法性、证据使用以及正确计算法规中的成本和收益 — 是监管机构的核心职能。原则上，审查旨在通过经济合理性、工具和方法提高法规的有效性。在实践中，监督机构的工作发生在规则制定过程的政治性中，可以成为行政部门控制监管议程的一种方式。根据对墨西哥监管监督机构为期 13 个月的民族志，我研究了分析师如何在面对政治紧张局势和干扰的同时制定监管改进的技术和法律要求。使用协商顺序理论，我展示了分析师如何通过扩大、屏蔽或改变他们的任务并相应地开展他们的工作来应对政治关注、冲突或干预。审查以改进法规具有不同的含义和形式，使分析师能够长期保护他们的工作、组织和技术法律授权。本文有助于更好地了解监管审查和监督机构。更重要的是，它引起了人们对工人如何通过不断协调他们工作的法律、技术和政治层面来实现雄心勃勃的治国项目（如监管改进）的关注。