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Shock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH ( IF 3.4 ) Pub Date : 2025-05-16 , DOI: 10.1177/00223433251331486
Yuleng Zeng, Andreas Dür

Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for two primary reasons. First, this allows them to signal their resolve not to back down to sanctioning states and potentially maintain their bargaining leverage. Second, higher relative military spending can strengthen leaders’ hold on power by improving their ability to co-opt and repress political opponents. However, this combined incentive to signal resolve and consolidate power weakens after the initial economic and political shocks. As such, we also expect that the increase in relative military spending will diminish gradually. To test our theory, we propose a new measurement of sanction shocks that carefully accounts for the salience, costs, and duration of different sanction episodes. Using this measure, we apply dynamic panel modeling to examine the military spending of 166 countries from 1962 to 2015. We find strong support for our theoretical expectations. In response to sanction shocks, target states choose to spend proportionally more on the military; this increase peaks in the first few years and dissipates over time. These results hold important implications for research on both economic sanctions and military spending.

中文翻译:


震惊与敬畏:经济制裁和相对军费开支



经济制裁可能会对目标国家造成重大伤害,迫使它们做出艰难的权衡。尽管现有研究认为,受制裁国家在绝对值上减少了军费开支,但尚不清楚它们是否确实在相对值上用更多的枪支换取黄油。我们认为,在短期内,受制裁国家有动力按比例向军队输送更多资源,主要有两个原因。首先,这使他们能够表明他们不向制裁国家退缩的决心,并可能保持他们的讨价还价筹码。其次,更高的相对军费开支可以提高领导人拉拢和镇压政治对手的能力,从而加强他们对权力的控制。然而,在最初的经济和政治冲击之后,这种表明决心和巩固权力的综合激励作用减弱了。因此,我们还预计相对军费开支的增加将逐渐减少。为了检验我们的理论,我们提出了一种新的制裁冲击测量方法,该测量方法仔细考虑了不同制裁事件的显著性、成本和持续时间。使用这一措施,我们应用动态面板建模来研究 166 年至 1962 年间 2015 个国家的军费开支。我们找到了对我们的理论期望的有力支持。为了应对制裁冲击,目标国家选择按比例增加军事开支;这种增长在最初几年达到顶峰,并随着时间的推移而消散。这些结果对经济制裁和军费开支的研究具有重要意义。
更新日期:2025-05-16
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