Since 2001, the United Nations Security Council has increasingly authorized interventions in support of a government. However, the potential impact of this trend on civil war processes is underexamined. I argue that biased peacekeeping interventions can undermine social order when replacing rebel territorial control. Interventions become associated with weak and predatory client governments, fail to build trust within communities, and create power vacuums. In the absence of a perceived impartial arbiter, mobilized groups turn to violence over disputes previously solved by the rebels. I test this theory by examining the impact of offensive operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Using novel data and a mixed-methods approach, I demonstrate AMISOM operations displacing rebel rule produced a significant increase in intercommunal conflict. These findings highlight the potential unintended consequences of multilateral interventions explicitly supporting one side. They further suggest biased interventions should focus on first improving governance before extending government control or prioritize shaping conditions for negotiated settlements.

中文翻译：

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叛军统治的终结：有偏见的维和干预和社会秩序


自 2001 年以来，联合国安理会越来越多地授权干预以支持政府。然而，这种趋势对内战进程的潜在影响没有得到充分的审查。我认为，有偏见的维和干预在取代叛军的领土控制时会破坏社会秩序。干预与软弱和掠夺性的附庸政府联系在一起，未能在社区内建立信任，并造成权力真空。在没有被认为公正的仲裁者的情况下，动员起来的团体对叛乱者之前解决的争端采取了暴力行动。我通过研究非洲联盟驻索马里特派团 （AMISOM） 的进攻行动的影响来检验这一理论。使用新的数据和混合方法，我证明了非索特派团取代叛军统治的行动导致部族间冲突显著增加。这些发现凸显了明确支持一方的多边干预可能产生的意外后果。他们进一步建议，有偏见的干预措施应该首先集中在扩大政府控制之前改善治理，或者优先考虑为谈判解决创造条件。