We analyze the drivers of the volume of traded allowances and number of transactions carried out by firms within the European Union Emissions Trading System to study whether heterogeneous levels of trade participation relate to different carbon abatement performances. We analyze the entire Phases II and III of the program. We show that the difference between acquired and transferred allowances is strongly related to the level of carbon emissions over total assets, suggesting that the net amount of allowances traded by firms is mainly due to compliance surrendering requirements. Such a relationship is stronger when firms are net buyers than net sellers of allowances, possibly implying a violation of the Coase theorem. Furthermore, we investigate the factors influencing the intensity of allowances trading. We find that the number of performed transactions is mainly related to business characteristics relevant to the EU ETS functioning, such as the amount of owned installations or managed voluntary opened accounts. We test several alternative model specifications, including banked allowances and non-linearities, and find supporting evidence of our results.

中文翻译：

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当交易强度满足合规要求时：对在 EU ETS 内运营的公司进行评估

我们分析了欧盟排放交易体系内公司进行的配额交易量和交易数量的驱动因素，以研究贸易参与的异质水平是否与不同的碳减排绩效有关。我们分析了该计划的整个第二阶段和第三阶段。我们表明，获得和转让配额之间的差异与总资产的碳排放水平密切相关，这表明公司交易的配额净额主要是由于合规性上缴要求。当公司是配额的净买家时，这种关系比净卖家更强，这可能意味着违反了科斯定理。此外，我们调查了影响津贴交易强度的因素。我们发现，执行的交易数量主要与欧盟 ETS 运作相关的业务特征有关，例如自有安装量或托管的自愿开立账户的数量。我们测试了几种替代模型规格，包括银行余量和非线性，并找到了我们结果的支持证据。