We study the role of blockchain in achieving information transparency and generating trust in a dyadic supply chain with one retailer sourcing from a single supplier. The retailer has superior information regarding the demand distribution, whereas the supplier sets the capacity in preparation for the selling season. Two sources of risk are identified: information risk, which captures the incentives of the retailer to portray a favorable market condition to the supplier to encourage the supplier to secure an ample capacity, and demand risk, which captures the potential for lost sales or excess capacity investment, even when knowing the correct demand distribution. We demonstrate how blockchain eliminates information risk for the supplier. As an alternative to blockchain, we analyze a commitment contract where the retailer can order in advance a certain number of units; this commitment can serve as a signaling tool to convey market information to the supplier. We argue that the commitment contract can eliminate the information risk for the supplier (as can blockchain), but it can also reduce the supplier’s demand risk. We conclude that in many instances, the supplier and the supply chain can become worse off when blockchain is used, while the retailer favors this technology.

中文翻译：

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真相、信任和权衡：当供应链中的区块链适得其反时


我们研究了区块链在实现信息透明度和在二元供应链中建立信任方面的作用，一个零售商从单一供应商处采购。零售商拥有有关需求分配的优质信息，而供应商则设置产能以准备销售季节。确定了两个风险来源：信息风险，它捕捉到零售商的激励，向供应商描绘有利的市场条件，以鼓励供应商获得充足的产能，以及需求风险，它捕捉到销售损失或产能投资过剩的可能性，即使知道正确的需求分布。我们演示了区块链如何为供应商消除信息风险。作为区块链的替代方案，我们分析了一份承诺合同，零售商可以提前订购一定数量的单位;此承诺可以作为向供应商传达市场信息的信号工具。我们认为，承诺合同可以消除供应商的信息风险（区块链也可以），但它也可以降低供应商的需求风险。我们得出的结论是，在许多情况下，当使用区块链时，供应商和供应链的情况可能会变得更糟，而零售商则偏爱这项技术。