This study examines the relationship between employee compensation and bureaucratic performance within the context of state budgeting. It hypothesizes that better-compensated rank-and-file employees within state financial administration are more effective at preventing budget overruns. Using data from all 50 U.S. states from 2006 to 2020, the findings reveal that higher compensation levels for rank-and-file employees are significantly and inversely associated with overspending, while the pay of senior financial administrators shows no significant effect. Additionally, gubernatorial spending preferences are identified as a contributing factor to overspending. This study contributes to the public management and HRM literature by emphasizing the role of compensation in enhancing fiscal discipline and provides practical insights for policymakers seeking to reduce budget variance.

中文翻译：

---

Budget Guardians： 财务管理员薪酬和预算超支

本研究考察了国家预算背景下员工薪酬与官僚绩效之间的关系。它假设州财政管理部门薪酬较高的基层雇员在防止预算超支方面更有效。使用 2006 年至 2020 年美国所有 50 个州的数据，研究结果表明，普通员工的较高薪酬水平与超支呈显著负相关，而高级财务管理人员的薪酬则没有显示出显着影响。此外，州长的支出偏好被认为是导致超支的一个因素。本研究通过强调薪酬在加强财政纪律中的作用，为公共管理和人力资源管理文献做出了贡献，并为寻求减少预算差异的政策制定者提供了实用的见解。