Differentiated lending terms for clean and dirty capital have become a popular tool among commercial banks as they promote themselves as advocates of environmental sustainability. Using a two-sector New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model where emissions are a by-product of dirty capital, we incorporate an interest spread responding elastically to carbon emissions: Banks offer lower lending rates to clean capital investment agencies when emission growth exceeds a target level. We find that while banks’ offering emission-elastic lending rate (EELR) is consistent with the regulator’s welfare objective, there is a tendency for banks to overreact to carbon emissions, resulting in increased loan volume, and thus, uncertainties in the financial sector. Although EELR faces more financial sector uncertainty, it outperforms Green Capital Requirements (GCR) in lowering the economic risk associated with the green transition.

中文翻译：

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可持续发展挂钩贷款能否调和环境和财务动机？

针对干净资本和肮脏资本的差异化贷款条款已成为商业银行的流行工具，因为它们将自己宣传为环境可持续性的倡导者。使用两个部门的新凯恩斯主义动态随机一般均衡 （DSGE） 模型，其中排放是肮脏资本的副产品，我们纳入了对碳排放弹性响应的利差：当排放增长超过目标水平时，银行向清洁资本投资机构提供较低的贷款利率。我们发现，虽然银行提供的排放弹性贷款利率 （EELR） 与监管机构的福利目标一致，但银行倾向于对碳排放反应过度，从而导致贷款量增加，从而带来金融部门的不确定性。尽管 EELR 面临更多的金融部门不确定性，但它在降低与绿色转型相关的经济风险方面优于绿色资本要求 （GCR）。