we examine whether regulatory punishments imposed on a firm affect the behavior of other firms that have not been punished previously but share cross-ownership with the former. We find that when a firm's cross-firm is punished, the probability of that firm engaging in misconduct decreases significantly in the subsequent year, suggesting that the punishment event generates a spillover effect. Our findings are robust to a series of robustness tests, especially taking into account other potential inter-firm connections. Mechanism analysis suggests that cross-ownership achieves this spillover effect by information transmission between firms. Moreover, the spillover effect is more potent when: (1) the punishment is more serious; (2) the punished firm is state-owned or large; (3) the cross-owner is state-owned, or the cross-owner has a higher proportion of shares in the unpunished firm, or the cross-owner has a larger number of investees; (4) the unpunished firm has more effective internal controls. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that regulatory punishments have significant spillover effects through cross-ownership.

中文翻译：

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罚一教百：处罚对未受罚企业事后不当行为的影响

我们研究了对公司施加的监管处罚是否会影响以前未受到处罚但与前者共享交叉所有权的其他公司的行为。我们发现，当一家公司的跨公司受到处罚时，该公司在下一年从事不当行为的概率显着降低，这表明处罚事件产生了溢出效应。我们的研究结果对一系列稳健性测试具有稳健性，特别是考虑到其他潜在的公司间联系。机制分析表明，交叉所有制通过企业之间的信息传递来实现这种溢出效应。此外，在以下情况下，溢出效应更为有效：（1） 惩罚更严重;（2） 被处罚企业为国有或大型企业;（3） 交叉所有人为国有企业，或交叉所有人在未受处罚公司中占有较高比例，或交叉所有人拥有较多的被投资人;（4） 未受惩罚的公司拥有更有效的内部控制。总体而言，我们的研究提供了新的证据，表明监管处罚通过交叉所有权具有显着的溢出效应。