We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm‐bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high‐quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.

中文翻译：

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银行业中环环相扣的董事会和竞争

我们研究了意大利立法的意外变化对公司贷款利率的影响，该立法禁止银行之间的连锁董事会。利用多个公司-银行关系来充分解释所有未观察到的异质性，我们发现，禁止联锁使以前环环相扣的银行的利率相对于其他银行降低了 14 个基点。对于高质量企业和具有较大联合市场份额的连锁银行发放的贷款，这种影响更为明显。以前互锁银行的贷款利率变得更加分散。最后，从以前相互关联的银行借款更多的公司扩大了投资、就业和销售。