INTRODUCTION

If voters do not like federal tax policy, they can elect new representatives. At the local level, though, voters can directly deny the tax increases their elected officials propose. All but three states have a limit on either the taxing or spending abilities of local governments and, most commonly, state laws require that increases in local taxes receive a public referendum before they are enacted (Mullins, 2010). In the November 2020 election, voters nationwide decided on the fate of $52.7 billion of proposed funding, down from $70 billion 4 years prior (Pierog, 2020).

Requirements that budgeting questions be put to a vote reduce the level of spending (Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Funk & Gathmann, 2011). However, the rules that govern these votes vary in myriad ways. States differ in the types of taxes or spending the rules cover: Some only allow proposals for capital spending, while others also include current expenditure spending. States also often limit the total amount of tax revenue or the tax rate governments can propose, and vary in whether they adjust for inflation, for changes in population, or for growth in the property tax base. Certain election rules limit the timing of when governments can put proposals on the ballot, since local governments may use this timing flexibility strategically (Anzia, 2011; Kogan et al., 2018; Meredith, 2009). States also differ in the vote share required to approve the proposals, with many proposals requiring more than a simple majority. There is little empirical research, however, documenting how these differences in voting requirements may affect government budgets, local spending, and the provision of public goods and services. This is a significant gap in the literature given the millions of dollars in funding at stake in each local referendum and the billions at stake nationwide.

In this paper, we study a proposition in California that weakened the constraints on some local governments by lowering the vote share required to approve capital funding for schools and community colleges. We use a difference-in-differences design around this policy change and data for over 4,000 local elections across the state over 2 decades. We estimate the effects of this policy change on the proposals made by affected districts, their outcomes at the ballot box, and on the eventual funding outcomes.

We develop a theoretical model of the interaction between a school board and voters, building on the literature in local political economy (Barseghyan & Coate, 2014; Coate & Ma, 2017; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982). In our model, the school board makes a tax proposal that the voter can accept or reject. Thus, the school board has “agenda-setting” power to extract policies closer to its preferences than those of the voter. However, uncertainty in how residents will vote hinders the exercise of this agenda-setting power. We use this model to show how a change in the required vote share affects the size of the proposals and the vote outcomes, and to show how these effects depend on the divergence in preferences between voters and elected officials.

We study how the policy change affected the funding outcomes of local governments. We find that Proposition 39 led to an additional $57 per resident in approved local government bonds, a more than 100% increase. This is a large impact, and one that affects governments unequally. There were larger effects on funding outcomes in more racially and ethnically diverse districts. Similarly, we find larger effects in jurisdictions with moderate levels of poverty, moderate White population shares, and fewer older residents. These results shed light on the characteristics of places where funding is most constrained by referendum requirements. Our model shows that the extent of a community's responsiveness to a change in the vote share requirement depends on the extent of disagreement between voters and their elected representatives, as well as the level of uncertainty in referenda outcomes that the elected officials face. Thus, the empirical results show what types of communities have larger disagreements or more uncertain election outcomes.

There are two channels through which these effects could occur: the behavior of elected officials when proposing funding and of voters when voting on the proposals. We find that the policy change made treated districts no more likely to propose a bond relative to other jurisdictions. However, the size of the bond proposals increased substantially, by $48 per resident, or a 59% increase. Naturally, the larger bond proposals may result in lower vote shares. Conditional on proposing a bond, we find that the policy change resulted in bond proposals receiving a lower percentage of votes in favor. However, this decline was smaller than the 11.7 percentage point decrease in the vote share requirement. In other words, school boards and community college districts experienced declines in support for their proposals that were smaller than the full amount of the policy change. Thus, we observe no change in the probability that affected districts approved any kind of new funding, and large increases in the probability that they approved new bonds. Even though these districts submitted larger proposals that had less support from the electorate, they resulted in increases in the probability of success. These results—a positive effect on proposal size and a negative effect on vote shares—are consistent with the politician preferring higher spending than the voters, when interpreted through the lens of our model.

Our paper contributes to several strands of research. First, we contribute to empirical evidence on the fiscal and policy effects of tax limits. This literature builds on the work of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979, 1982), which modeled the constraint on government in contexts where government officials have agenda setting power. Balsdon et al. (2003) applied the logic of these agenda-setting models to proposals of and voting on school bonds. The authors estimated a structural model of school boards and voters and found that school boards favor a higher level of spending than voters but are risk averse in their proposals. We extend this line of research by leveraging a policy change, and our finding that relaxing the voting threshold results in larger proposals is consistent with their result.

We also contribute to an empirical literature on the effects of tax limits on the quality of public services (Dye & McGuire, 1997; Figlio & Rueben, 2001; Poterba & Rueben, 1995; Rose, 2010). These papers study the effect of the existence of local tax limits. By contrast, in this paper we study a change in a particular characteristic of the limit itself. Romer et al. (1992) shared that aim and considered the effects of matching aid and supermajority requirements in the context of their structural model. However, their data did not contain any heterogeneity in the vote requirements. We show that the vote share required to pass public spending has large effects on the amount of spending both proposed and implemented.

While this paper is the first to our knowledge to study the effects of the change in the voting threshold, two papers have studied voting on the constitutional amendment that resulted in this policy change. Brunner and Ross (2010) developed a model of voter support for supermajority rules and showed that voter support for the supermajority rules is related to the income distribution in their school district. Balsdon et al. (2005) showed that voters in metropolitan areas with a more fragmented set of school districts were more likely to vote for the reduction in the threshold. An existing literature has studied supermajority voting rules in the context of legislative voting (Crain & Miller, 1989; Messner & Polborn, 2004). Most related to our work is Knight (2000), which instrumented for supermajority requirements with the ease of amending state constitutions and found that supermajority requirements lead to lower taxes. This paper complements these analyses by examining the effect of a change in the severity of a supermajority requirement in the context of public referenda.

The environment of voting on school financing and the effect of the resulting funding has received significant study. Cerdán and Rueben (2003) detailed the history of school funding referenda in California. While we study the process of the school votes themselves, Cellini et al. (2010) studied the effects of the resulting capital investments on house prices and Cellini (2009) examined their effects on higher education. These papers are part of a broader literature that studies the effects of school construction; the evidence on its effect on student outcomes is mixed. Large school construction projects may lead to improved student outcomes (Aaronson & Mazumder, 2011; Conlin & Thompson, 2017; Duflo, 2001; Neilson & Zimmerman, 2014). However, studies using regression discontinuity approaches to study school capital improvement bond referenda, like those we study, have found limited evidence of positive effects on student outcomes (Cellini et al., 2010; Choi, 2019; Martorell et al., 2016). An exception is Hong and Zimmer (2016), which found positive long-run effects on test scores in Michigan. Biasi et al. (2024) found generally positive effects of capital improvements on test scores, and Jackson and Mackevicius (2024) found generally positive effects of spending on student outcomes, as have studies that focused on particular targets of spending like air conditioning (Park et al., 2020). These studies have consistently found positive, sometimes large, effects on house prices, suggesting that households care a great deal about school facilities and school quality.

Lastly, we contribute to a literature on the support for public goods in diverse communities. We show how the effects of the loosened electoral constraint differ by the racial makeup of the jurisdiction. A broad literature has found that diversity is related to decreased support for government (Alesina et al., 1999; Dahlberg et al., 2012). However, some of these findings are not robust to alternative specifications (Boustan et al., 2013). Closely related to our work is Rugh and Trounstine (2011), which showed that more diverse cities propose fewer, larger municipal bonds than less diverse cities but end up authorizing similar levels of debt. The strategic proposals they documented could drive the differential response to the policy change we study. Recent work has shown that increased diversity among local elected officials results in less spending on public goods (Beach & Jones, 2017). Our results suggest that in more diverse places, elected officials would prefer a higher level of spending than the voters.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide further detail about local government funding and the policy change we study; in “Conceptual Framework” we describe our model; in “Data” we describe the data we use; in “Empirical Approach” we explain the empirical method; in “Results” we describe our results; and in “Conclusion” we conclude.

中文翻译：

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放宽地方教育经费的选举限制

  介绍

如果选民不喜欢联邦税收政策，他们可以选举新的代表。不过，在地方一级，选民可以直接否决他们民选官员提出的增税提议。除三个州外，所有州都对地方政府的征税或支出能力有限制，最常见的是，州法律要求增加地方税在颁布之前接受公众公投（Mullins，2010 年）。在 2020 年 11 月的选举中，全国选民决定了 527 亿美元拟议资金的命运，低于 4 年前的 700 亿美元（Pierog，2020 年）。

要求将预算问题付诸表决会降低支出水平（Feld & Matsusaka，2003;Funk & Gathmann，2011 年）。然而，管理这些投票的规则以多种方式有所不同。各州在规则涵盖的税收或支出类型上有所不同：有些州只允许资本支出提案，而另一些州还包括当期支出。各州还经常限制税收总额或政府可以提议的税率，并在调整通货膨胀、人口变化还是财产税基增长方面有所不同。某些选举规则限制了政府可以将提案提交选票的时间，因为地方政府可能会战略性地利用这种时间灵活性（Anzia，2011 年;Kogan 等 人，2018 年;Meredith，2009 年）。各州在批准提案所需的票数份额方面也有所不同，许多提案需要的不仅仅是简单多数。然而，很少有实证研究记录投票要求的这些差异如何影响政府预算、地方支出以及公共产品和服务的提供。考虑到每次地方公投涉及数百万美元的资金，而全国范围内涉及数十亿美元，这在文献中是一个很大的差距。

在本文中，我们研究了加利福尼亚州的一个提案，该提案通过降低批准学校和社区学院资本资金所需的投票份额来削弱对一些地方政府的限制。我们围绕这项政策变化以及 2 年来全州 4,000 多次地方选举的数据使用了双重差分设计。我们估计了这项政策变化对受影响地区提出的提案、他们在投票箱中的结果以及最终的资金结果的影响。

我们开发了一个关于学校董事会和选民之间互动的理论模型，以地方政治经济学的文献为基础（Barseghyan & Coate，2014;Coate & 马， 2017;Romer & Rosenthal，1982 年）。在我们的模型中，学校董事会提出了一个选民可以接受或拒绝的税收提案。因此，学校董事会拥有“议程设定”的权力，可以制定比选民更接近其偏好的政策。然而，居民投票方式的不确定性阻碍了这一议程设置权的行使。我们使用此模型来说明所需投票份额的变化如何影响提案的大小和投票结果，并说明这些影响如何取决于选民和民选官员之间的偏好差异。

我们研究了政策变化如何影响地方政府的资金结果。我们发现，39 号提案导致每位居民在批准的地方政府债券中额外增加了 57 美元，增长了 100% 以上。这是一个巨大的影响，对政府的影响是不平等的。在种族和民族更加多样化的地区，对资金结果的影响更大。同样，我们发现在贫困程度适中、白人人口比例适中和老年居民较少的司法管辖区，影响更大。这些结果揭示了资金最受公投要求限制的地方的特征。我们的模型表明，社区对选票份额要求变化的响应程度取决于选民与其当选代表之间的分歧程度，以及民选官员面临的公投结果的不确定性程度。因此，实证结果表明哪些类型的社区存在更大的分歧或更不确定的选举结果。

这些影响可能通过两种渠道发生：民选官员在提议资助时的行为和选民在对提案进行投票时的行为。我们发现，相对于其他司法管辖区，政策变化使受处理的学区不太可能提出债券。然而，债券提案的规模大幅增加，每位居民增加了 48 美元，或增长了 59%。自然，较大的债券提案可能会导致较低的投票份额。以提议债券为条件，我们发现政策变化导致债券提案获得较低的赞成票百分比。然而，这一下降幅度小于投票份额要求的 11.7 个百分点的下降幅度。换句话说，学校董事会和社区大学学区对其提案的支持率下降幅度小于政策变化的全部金额。因此，我们观察到受影响地区批准任何类型新资金的概率没有变化，并且他们批准新债券的概率大幅增加。尽管这些选区提交的提案规模较大，选民支持率较低，但它们增加了成功的可能性。从我们的模型角度来解释，这些结果——对提案规模的积极影响和对选票份额的消极影响——与政治家更喜欢比选民更高的支出是一致的。

我们的论文为几个研究领域做出了贡献。首先，我们为税收限制的财政和政策影响的实证证据做出了贡献。这些文献建立在 Romer 和 Rosenthal （1978， 1979， 1982） 的工作基础上，他们模拟了政府官员拥有议程设定权的情况下对政府的约束。Balsdon 等 人（2003 年）将这些议程设置模型的逻辑应用于学校债券的提案和投票。作者估计了学校董事会和选民的结构模型，发现学校董事会比选民更倾向于更高的支出水平，但在他们的提案中却规避风险。我们通过利用政策变化来扩展这一研究方向，我们的发现是放宽投票门槛会导致更大的提案，这与它们的结果一致。

我们还为关于税收限制对公共服务质量影响的实证文献做出了贡献（Dye & McGuire，1997 年;Figlio & Rueben， 2001;Poterba & Rueben， 1995;Rose，2010 年）。这些论文研究了地方税收限制存在的影响。相比之下，在本文中，我们研究了极限本身特定特征的变化。Romer et al. （1992） 分享了这一目标，并在其结构模型的背景下考虑了匹配援助和绝对多数要求的影响。然而，他们的数据在投票要求中不包含任何异质性。我们表明，通过公共支出所需的选票份额对提议和实施的支出金额有很大影响。

虽然这篇论文是我们所知的第一篇研究投票门槛变化影响的论文，但有两篇论文研究了导致这一政策变化的宪法修正案的投票。Brunner 和 Ross （2010） 开发了一个选民支持绝对多数规则的模型，并表明选民对绝对多数规则的支持与他们学区的收入分配有关。Balsdon 等 人（2005 年）表明，在学区更加分散的大都市地区的选民更有可能投票支持降低门槛。现有的文献在立法投票的背景下研究了绝对多数投票规则（Crain & Miller，1989;Messner & Polborn，2004 年）。与我们的工作最相关的是 Knight （2000），该研究通过修改州宪法的便利性来满足绝对多数要求，并发现绝对多数要求会导致较低的税收。本文通过研究在公众公投背景下绝对多数要求严重程度变化的影响来补充这些分析。

对学校资助进行投票的环境以及由此产生的资金的影响已经得到了重要的研究。Cerdán 和 Rueben （2003） 详细介绍了加利福尼亚学校资助公投的历史。当我们研究学校投票本身的过程时，Cellini 等 人（2010 年）研究了由此产生的资本投资对房价的影响，Cellini （2009 年）研究了它们对高等教育的影响。这些论文是研究学校建设影响的更广泛文献的一部分;关于其对学生成绩影响的证据喜忧参半。大型学校建设项目可能会提高学生的成绩（Aaronson & Mazumder，2011 年;Conlin & Thompson， 2017;Duflo， 2001;Neilson & Zimmerman，2014 年）。然而，使用回归不连续性方法来研究学校资本改善债券公投的研究，就像我们研究的研究一样，发现对学生成绩有积极影响的证据有限（Cellini 等 人，2010 年;Choi， 2019;Martorell et al.， 2016）。一个例外是 Hong 和 Zimmer （2016），他们发现对密歇根州的考试成绩有积极的长期影响。Biasi 等 人（2024 年）发现资本改善对考试成绩的普遍积极影响，Jackson 和 Mackevicius（2024 年）发现支出对学生成绩的普遍积极影响，关注空调等特定支出目标的研究也是如此（Park 等 人，2020 年）。这些研究一致发现，对房价有积极的影响，有时甚至是很大的影响，这表明家庭非常关心学校设施和学校质量。

最后，我们为有关支持不同社区公共产品的文献做出了贡献。我们展示了放宽选举限制的影响如何因司法管辖区的种族构成而异。大量文献发现，多样性与对政府的支持率下降有关（Alesina et al.， 1999;Dahlberg et al.， 2012）。然而，其中一些发现对替代规范并不稳健（Boustan et al.， 2013）。与我们的工作密切相关的是 Rugh 和 Trounstine （2011），他们表明，与多元化程度较低的城市相比，多元化程度较高的城市提议的市政债券数量较少，规模较大，但最终授权的债务水平相似。他们记录的战略建议可能会推动对我们研究的政策变化的不同反应。最近的研究表明，地方民选官员的多样性增加会导致公共产品支出减少（Beach & Jones，2017）。我们的结果表明，在更多样化的地方，民选官员比选民更愿意获得更高的支出水平。

本文的其余部分组织如下。在下一节中，我们将提供有关地方政府资金和我们研究的政策变化的更多详细信息;在“概念框架”中，我们描述了我们的模型;在“数据”中，我们描述了我们使用的数据;在“实证方法”中，我们解释了实证方法;在“结果”中，我们描述了我们的结果;在“结论”中，我们得出结论。