Even if member states formally comply with EU law, the ‘ideal type’ of literal compliance, where EU rules are compliantly transposed without customizing their density or restrictiveness, is both rare and improbable. Why do EU member states engage in literal compliance in the ‘least likely’ case of the EU's Fiscal Compact, where customized transposition is crucial for member states to ‘regain control’ over a core state power? Why do external pressures for uniformity trump or reinforce internal pressures for diversity, or vice versa? We analyze the transposition of six fiscal treaty rules in France, Germany, and Italy (N = 18) using fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Literal compliance results from high policy fit and the need to signal responsiveness to external pressures from the EU and financial markets. Even though it may appear unlikely, literal compliance with EU fiscal policy does occur when uniformity is both easier and more important than diversity for member states.

中文翻译：

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了解欧盟多层次财政治理中的字面合规性

即使成员国正式遵守欧盟法律，“理想类型”的字面合规性，即欧盟规则被合规地转换而不定制其密度或限制性，既罕见又不可能。为什么欧盟成员国在欧盟财政契约“最不可能”的情况下进行字面上的遵守，其中定制的换位对于成员国“重新获得对核心国家权力的控制权”至关重要？为什么对一致性的外部压力会压倒或加强对多样性的内部压力，或者反之亦然？我们使用模糊集定性比较分析分析了法国、德国和意大利 （N = 18） 的六项财政协定规则的换位。字面上的合规性源于高度的政策契合度以及对来自欧盟和金融市场的外部压力的响应信号需求。尽管看起来不太可能，但对成员国来说，当统一比多样性更容易、更重要时，确实会真正遵守欧盟财政政策。