We study how common ownership affects the magnitude and dynamics of investments in a duopoly. Followers exhibit less aggressive timing and quantity reactions because they internalize their effects on leaders. Leaders are therefore more likely to opt for a deterrence strategy, but their own internalization of followers softens their decisions. If firm roles are exogenous, high common ownership links lead to a relatively efficient staged investment outcome. Conversely, if firm roles are endogenous, high common ownership drives the winner of the preemption race to concede a “follower monopoly.” Our numerical analysis finds that common ownership is generally detrimental to consumer surplus and welfare.

中文翻译：

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具有共同所有权的战略容量投资

我们研究了共同所有权如何影响双头垄断投资的规模和动态。追随者表现出不那么激进的时机和数量反应，因为他们内化了他们对领导者的影响。因此，领导者更有可能选择威慑策略，但他们自己对追随者的内化会软化他们的决定。如果公司角色是外生的，那么高度的共同所有权联系会导致相对有效的阶段性投资结果。相反，如果公司角色是内生的，那么高度的共同所有权会驱使抢占竞争的获胜者承认“追随者垄断”。我们的数值分析发现，共同所有权通常不利于消费者剩余和福利。