This paper proposes a simple measure of the Fed's inattention to incoming information, based on the persistence of disagreement between the Fed and professional forecasters. I document a substantial degree of persistent disagreement over time and across variables, typically exceeding half. At a short horizon, there is also evidence of a significant attention advantage of the Fed over professional forecasters. Both the level of attention and the attention advantage are cyclical and tend to increase during periods of monetary easing, thus highlighting the state dependency of the information channel in monetary policy.

中文翻译：

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美联储的关注

本文基于美联储与专业预测者之间持续存在的分歧，提出了一种衡量美联储对传入信息不关注的简单衡量标准。我记录了随着时间的推移和变量之间存在相当程度的持续分歧，通常超过一半。在短时间内，还有证据表明，美联储比专业预测者具有显着的关注优势。注意力水平和注意力优势都是周期性的，在货币宽松期间往往会增加，从而突出了货币政策中信息渠道的状态依赖性。