Despite the ubiquity of private firms, questions concerning the influence of owner-management and board governance on strategic decision-making in private firms have received limited attention. To explore these questions, we draw on the performance feedback literature and use longitudinal data from 27,704 U.K. and 7272 Belgian private firms to examine strategic investment in private firms. We find that board oversight increases the likelihood that firms will adjust investment levels in line with predictions by the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTOF), as firms with high board oversight increase investment when performance falls below aspirations and reduce it when performance exceeds aspirations. In contrast, low board oversight is associated with deviations from BTOF predictions, as firms with low board oversight tend to reduce investment when performance is below aspirations but increase it even when performance is well above aspirations. These findings suggest that governed (high oversight) and ungoverned (low oversight) private firms follow different decisionmaking logics; governed firms appear to engage in coalition-based decision-making, while decision-making in ungoverned firms appears to be dominated by owner-managers, whose investment preferences resemble those of risk-averse, undiversified investors. We also find that the relationship between owner-management, performance feedback, and strategic investment is tempered (offset) by board oversight. In sum, our findings indicate boards play a critical role in private firms by promoting collective goals (as identified and enacted by the board) and limiting the influence of owner-manager's personal goals, risk-preferences, and individual economic interests on the firm's response to performance feedback.

中文翻译：

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私营企业的所有者管理、董事会治理和对绩效反馈的回应

尽管私营企业无处不在，但有关所有者管理和董事会治理对私营企业战略决策的影响的问题受到的关注有限。为了探讨这些问题，我们借鉴了绩效反馈文献，并使用来自 27,704 家英国私营公司和 7272 家比利时私营公司的纵向数据来研究对私营公司的战略投资。我们发现，董事会监督增加了公司根据公司行为理论 （BTOF） 的预测调整投资水平的可能性，因为董事会监督严格的公司会在业绩低于预期时增加投资，而当业绩超过预期时减少投资。相比之下，董事会监督率低与 BTOF 预测的偏差有关，因为董事会监督率低的公司往往在业绩低于预期时减少投资，但即使业绩远高于预期，也会增加投资。这些发现表明，受治理（高监督）和未受治理（低监督）的私营公司遵循不同的决策逻辑;受治理的公司似乎参与基于联盟的决策，而未受治理的公司似乎由所有者经理主导，他们的投资偏好类似于规避风险、不多元化的投资者。我们还发现，所有者-管理层、绩效反馈和战略投资之间的关系会受到董事会监督的调节（抵消）。总之，我们的研究结果表明，董事会通过促进集体目标（由董事会确定和制定）并限制所有者经理的个人目标、风险偏好和个人经济利益对公司对绩效反馈的反应的影响，在私营企业中发挥着关键作用。